#acl UserGroup:read,write,revert All:read

= Implementations of automated Masking =
 * Andrew Moss, Elisabeth Oswald, Dan Page, and Michael Tunstall. '''Compiler Assisted  M''''''asking'''. In Emmanuel Prouff and Patrick Schaumont, editors, CHES, volume 7428 of LNCS, pages 58–75. Springer, 2012

 * G. Agosta, A. Barenghi, M. Maggi and G. Pelosi, "'''Compiler-based side channel ''''''vulnerability analysis and optimized countermeasures application'''" Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2013 50th ACM/EDAC/IEEE, Austin, TX, 2013, p. 1-6.

= Obfuscation =
 * PhD thesis of Stéphanie Riaud (in French): http://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-00636793/document
 * Obfuscator-LLVM:
  * Bogus Control Flow (https://github.com/obfuscator-llvm/obfuscator/wiki/Bogus-Control-Flow) Average overhead performance ➡ 28 %
  * Control Flow Flattening (https://github.com/obfuscator-llvm/obfuscator/wiki/Control-Flow-Flattening) Average overhead performance ➡ 860 %
  * Instruction Substitution (https://github.com/obfuscator-llvm/obfuscator/wiki/Instructions-Substitution) Average overhead performance ➡ 13.5 %
  * A commercial version of this project with more features is available at https://strong.codes/

= Model of attacker =
In the case of cyber attacks

 * Attacker can run programs on the same machine
  * attack on the branch predictor.<<BR>>(in French, has links) https://interstices.info/jcms/c_25753/une-faille-de-securite-dans-les-processeurs
  * attack on the Dcache (need ref)
 * Attacker interacts with remote machine
  * buffer overflow, canari, ASLR, CFI
  * Canaries with Clang: -fstack-protector, -fstack-protector-strong, -fstack-protector-all
  * ASLR with Clang: -fpie -pie
  * Safe stack with Clang: -fsanitize=safe-stack. More information : http://dslab.epfl.ch/proj/cpi/ (research prototype)
  * CFI with Clang: -fsanitize=cfi. More information : http://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html
  * Global Offset Table (GOT) Protection with Clang: -Wl,-z,now -Wl,-z,relro